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Abstract
This work evaluates the role of institutions on per capita income levels
(cross-section) and growth models (panel data). The cross-section results
suggest that there is some evidence regarding the role of institutions since
all the estimated coefficients are positive and statistically significant but
there is evidence of weak instruments. The results from the panel growth
models suggest that there is scarce evidence for the role of institutions in
fostering long-run growth. In one word, there is no indication of an em-
pirical consensus to claim that institutions have a primary role, meaning
that institutions cause growth and difference in income levels.
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Resumo
O presente trabalho examina o papel das instituições em modelos de
renda per capita (corte transversal) e de crescimento (painel). Os resulta-
dos das estimações de corte transversal sugerem que há alguma evidência
quanto ao papel das instituições dado que os coeficientes estimados são
positivos e estatisticamente significativos, mas existem evidências de que
os instrumentos utilizados são fracos. Os resultados para os modelos de
crescimento sugerem que há poucas evidências quanto arelevância das
instituições para estimular o crescimento. Sumarizando, não há indicação
de um consenso empírico capaz de sustentar o argumento do papel pri-
mordial das instituições, ou seja, de que instituições causem crescimento
ou diferenças nos níveis de renda.
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1 Introduction
A wide variety of empirical studies on growth and per capita income levels
using institutions as an explanatory variable have been developed during the
last decade and there is some empirical evidence that the quality of institu-
tions do matter but there is no consensus on what is called the institution rule
hypothesis. In other words, once we incorporate institutions in our model, it
is not clear if other factors such as geography, trade integration and policy
variables will play only an indirect role on growth and differences in income
levels.
This work evaluates the role of institutions on per capita income levels
models and growth models for a set of almost one hundred countries, using
cross-section and dynamic panel data analysis to answer two questions: Do
Institutions have a primary role on explaining huge cross-country differences
on per capita income levels? Does long-run growth performance relies mainly
on institutional quality? The variable used as proxy for institutional quality
is the Law and Order index for both models.
The results of the per capita income level models and the results of the
growth models suggest that there is no indication of an empirical consensus
to claim that institutions have a primary role, meaning that institutions cause
difference in income levels and growth. One of the main novelties of the paper
is to bring together both cross-section (income levels models using 2SLS esti-
mation method) and panel data (growth models using System and Difference
GMM estimation methods) analysis but most importantly to provide a deeper
investigation regarding the use of instruments and see if they are valid and
not weak and if there is no problem with instrument proliferation.
The paper provides two main contributions to the literature. First, the
empirical analysis can be considered an advance on methodological grounds
by developing a rigorous investigation on whether or not the instruments
are valid, relevant and if there is instrument proliferation, which are crucial
for parameter estimation and inference since institutions are endogenous to
growth and development. The second contribution is related to the fact that
once we consider the issue of excessive, valid and relevant instruments, the hy-
pothesis that institutions cause differences in per capita income and in long-
run growth is not corroborated by the empirical results, which questions a
relative consensus on the literature.
The paper is organized in three sections other than this introduction and
final remarks. Section two is devoted to summarize the empirical and the-
oretical literature on economic growth and differences in per capita income
levels among countries with the inclusion of institutions and other control
variables. Section three develops a cross-section analysis based on per capita
income models and summarizes the results for the 2SLS estimation method.
Section four develops a dynamic panel data analysis based on growth models
and reports the results for System and Difference GMM estimation methods.
2 Institutions, Differences in Per Capita Income and Economic
Growth: Theory and Evidence
Economic growth and differences in countries per capita income levels have
been the focus of several research studies in the field of macroeconomics
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and also a topic of interest for policymakers, as well as in other areas of re-
search, such as reduction of poverty and economic development. The liter-
ature of economic growth and differences on per capita income levels made
significant progress on theoretical and empirical grounds during the last two
decades. Most of this advance is due to new econometric techniques and
longer database, incorporating lessons from the endogenous growth and hu-
man capital models and empirically the novelty has been on how to deal with
the endogeneity problem and the use of valid instruments. The use of econo-
metric techniques based on GMM estimation for dynamic panel data analy-
sis for growth models and cross-section analysis with two stage least squares
(2SLS) to test for differences in per capita income levels is part of this advance
and both of them will be implemented in this paper1.
The empirical evidence from the growth and the cross country income lev-
els difference literatures suggest a positive association with the quality of insti-
tutions meaning that better institutions foster long run economic growth and
countries with better institutions are the ones with higher per capita income
levels. Figure 2 illustrate such evidence for our complete set of 91 countries
where the proxy for institution (Law & Order) shows a positive and statisti-
cally significant coefficient when plotted against the log of per capita GDP
and the GDP growth rate. Regardless of such primary evidence it is necessary
to investigate econometrically such relationship in both models using the ade-
quate techniques such as GMM System and Difference for growth models and
2SLS for models of per capita income levels. It is fair to say that the positive
coefficients reported in both graphs does not imply a specific causality from
institutions to GDP growth and per capita GDP levels since we might face
reverse causality in the sense that countries with higher income levels and
growth rates can create a better institutional environment, which is likely to
happen in most cases.
Initially, it is necessary to address the role of institution and its definition.
North (1990) definition of institutions is associated to the idea that institu-
tions are the rules of the game in a society and it imposes constraints that
shape human interaction. Acemoglu & Robinson (2004) highlights the rele-
vance of institutions for improving economic growth and development, argu-
ing that:
Economic institutions are important because they influence the
structure of economic incentives in society, and without property
rights, individuals will not have the incentive to invest in physical
or human capital or adopt more efficient technologies. Economic
institutions are also important because they help to allocate re-
1A historical look on the growth literature reveals that during the 1950s and 1960s growth
theory was linked primarily to the neoclassical model developed by Ramsey (1928), Solow (1956),
Swan (1956), Cass (1965) and Koopmans (1965). These models were based on the so-called con-
vergence property and the idea is that economies with low per capita GDPwill face higher growth
rates given the assumption of diminishing capital returns. Since the 1980s, the concept of cap-
ital in the neoclassical model has been expanded to incorporate not only physical capital but
also human capital, as seen through the models developed by Lucas (1988) and Rebelo (1991),
among others. Romer (1994) highlights the dilemma encountered by the theoretical and em-
pirical growth literatures and the contribution of endogenous growth theory to understand the
long-term growth, arguing that the main contribution of this approach is to provide a theory of
technological progress, one of the central elements absent from the neoclassical growth model.
The inclusion of a theory of technological change in the neoclassical framework is difficult, since
the conventional assumptions of competitiveness cannot be maintained.
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Figure 1: Per Capita GDP and GDP Growth vs Institutions (Law)
sources to their most efficient uses, they determine who gets prof-
its, revenues and residual rights of control.
On the empirical evolution of the growth literature and the contribution of
geography, integration and institutions, Rodrik et al. (2004) argues that:
Growth theory has traditionally focused on physical and human
capital accumulation, and, in its endogenous growth variant, on
technological change. But accumulation and technological change
are at best proximate causes of economic growth. (. . . )
But why did some societies manage to accumulate and innovate
more rapidly than others? The three-fold classification offered
above – geography, integration, and institutions – allow us to or-
ganize our thoughts on the “deeper” determinants of economic
growth. These three are the factors that determine which societies
will innovate and accumulate, and therefore develop, and which
will not.
The following review of the literature will be divided into two sets. The
first one deal with the empirical studies where the per capita GDP growth rate
is the dependent variable, while the second one has the per capita GDP level
as the dependent variable since it is concerned with differences in such levels
across countries and not with their growth rates.
The evolution of the empirical growth literature using panel data goes
back to the work developed by Barro et al. (1995) using data for more than one
hundred countries from 1960 to 1990. The empirical results suggest that, for
a given level of real per capita income, the growth rate is positively affected by
the level of education and life expectancy, low fertility, lower government con-
sumption, by maintaining the rule of law, lower inflation rate, improvement
in the terms of trade, and negatively by the initial level of real per capita GDP.
The inflation rate not only has a negative impact on real GDP growth in the
long run, but also on the investment rate, but this result is statistically signif-
icant when the economies with a history of high inflation are included in the
sample2.
2See Bruno & Easterly (1998) for additional evidence on inflation and growth.
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Acemoglu & Robinson (2004) develops the empirical and theoretical case
where differences in economic institutions are the fundamental cause of differ-
ences in economic development since there are different ways of organizing
societies in order to encourage innovation, to save for the future, to find better
ways to improve knowledge and education, and to provide public goods.
Acemoglu et al. (2001) is a referential paper on addressing the endogene-
ity problem of using proxies for institutions when examining and evaluating
difference in economic performance among countries. The paper uses differ-
ences in mortality rates as an instrument to estimate the effect of institutions
on economic growth using 2SLS estimation, and the results are robust to dif-
ferent specifications, indicating the occurrence of significant effects of insti-
tutions on per capita income for a set of 64 countries. The main idea of the
model is to estimate the coefficients associated to variables (indexes) of pro-
tection to the risk of expropriation as a proxy for institutions. The argument
is that countries with better institutions, with more secure property rights,
and policies with less distortion, tend to invest more in physical and human
capital and usually have a more efficient use of such production factors in or-
der to achieve a higher level of income. The authors make clear that when
using the mortality rate as an instrument for institutions, this is valid only if
other variables that are correlated with the mortality rate are not related to
the per capita income. The idea is that the instrument for institutions (mor-
tality rate) should be an important factor to capture the variation observed in
the institutions, without having an effect on the growth rate.
Rodrik (1999) investigates the difference in growth rates for the periods
1960-75 and 1975-89 and the motivation of the study is to understand some
issues and questions there are not a consensus in the growth literature such as:
what are the crucial factors responsible for instability in the economic perfor-
mance of developing countries; why countries that have a good economic per-
formance in the 1960s and 1970s have had problems in the following decades;
why some countries were strongly but shortly affected by external volatility
in the second half of 1970 while others took a lot of time to recover from
such external shocks; what are the main reasons underlying the process of ex-
pansion of the adverse effects of external shocks on the growth rate of many
economies.
The hypothesis investigated by Rodrik (1999) is that domestic social con-
flicts are crucial to understand and answer the above questions as these con-
flicts have a negative impact on productivity, besides being related to cases
involving the postponement of policies associated to fiscal and relative prices
(real exchange rate and wages) adjustments. Another key aspect is the effect
that such conflicts have on the uncertainty (investment decision) of the econ-
omy and the diversion of activities out of the production sector. The empirical
analysis uses indicators of inequality, ethnic fragmentation, quality of govern-
ment institutions, rule of law, democratic rights and social protection network
to test RodriK’s hypothesis. The results indicate that countries that had the
greatest reduction in the rate of GDP growth in 1975 were those where soci-
ety is more fragmented and has fragile institutions. The degree of severity of
external shocks can be considered secondary in explaining the differences in
growth rates between countries, and once controlling for social conflicts and
institutional quality, other factors (trade policies, government consumption,
ratio of debt / exports) have little explanatory power over such differences
in growth rates, or are secondary factors when compared with the social con-
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flict that ultimately is linked to the adoption of inadequate macroeconomic
policies.
The second branch of the literature deals with empirical tests on the role
of institutions and other factors in explaining why countries have such a huge
difference in per capita income levels. Hall & Jones (1999) is one of the pio-
neers in examining the issue of why output per capita is so different across
countries using a large set of countries. The main goal is to explain changes
in long-run economic performance focusing directly in the investigation of
cross-section analysis for income levels. One of the main empirical findings
is that differences in capital accumulation, productivity and ultimately in per
capita income is due to differences in institutions and government policies.
The authors call this as social infrastructure and considered it as endogenous,
which requires finding variables that are good instruments (location and lan-
guage) in order to overcome problems such as coefficient bias in the presence
of endogenous variables3 . The authors emphasize that productivity is crucial
to understand such differences in income levels. The goal is to answer two
main questions: Why there is a significant difference in investments in phys-
ical and human capital? Why there is an important productivity difference
across countries?
In order to answer these questions, Hall & Jones (1999) argue that long
run economic performance of a country is primarily determined by social in-
frastructure, meaning that differences in capital accumulation, productivity
and ultimately in per capita output are related to different levels of social in-
frastructure. Examining 127 countries the authors found a close and positive
relation between per capita output and social infrastructure. After controlling
for endogeneity of social infrastructure (institutions and government policies)
they still find evidence that most of differences in long-run economic per-
formance is due to differences in social infrastructure across countries. The
estimated coefficient for output per capita and productivity is 0.60 and the
correlation between the differences for the two series in log is 0.89. Most of
the differences in output per capita are due to productivity by a factor of 8.3
against human capital with 2.2 and capital intensity with 1.8 when compar-
ing the five highest and lowest countries in terms of output per capita, which
are different by more than 30 times for this set of countries.
The estimation of the social infrastructure index (SI) by Hall & Jones (1999)
uses a combination of two indexes to construct the proxy for SI. One is the in-
dex of government antidiversion policies (GADP) based on data from the Polit-
ical Risk Service (130 countries and 24 categories) and the authors select five
categories: law and order; bureaucracy quality; corruption; risk of expropria-
tion and government repudiation of contracts, each of them as average for the
period of 1986-95. The second index tries to capture the degree of openness to
trade and it draws from the data developed by Sachs & Warner (1995) and it
varies from 0 to 1 according to criteria such as: level of nontariff barriers; aver-
age tariff rates; blackmarket premium; country classified as non-socialist; and
absence of government as a monopolist for major exports. The final proxy for
SI is given by the sum of GADP and the openness index and the instruments
used captures geography characteristics (distance from the equator), the West-
3Studies such asWeil et al. (1992) was crucial in setting an empirical agenda to investigate dif-
ferences in per capita income levels across countries based on differences in human and physical
capital and productivity.
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ern European influence (primary spoken language) and the (log) predicted
trade share of the economy constructed by Frankel & Romer (1999). The esti-
mated model for output per capita shows that the estimated coefficient for so-
cial infrastructure is positive (for the main specification βˆSI = 5.14 with four
instruments) and statistically significant for all specifications. The authors
conclude after some robustness tests that taking into account elements such
as geography (distance from the equator) and Western influence (language),
differences in social infrastructure determines (cause) large differences in per
capita income across countries.
Other works such as the one developed by Easterly & Levine (2003) is
focused on understanding differences in per capita income across countries.
They develop an analysis first reviewing the empirical literature / theories
of how geography, institutions, and policy influence economic development
and so the disparity in income levels. The geography / endowment hypothesis
argues that environment has a direct impact on the quality of land, labor, and
production technologies, while the institution view is based on the idea that
the environment’s main impact on economic development operates through
institutions. The policy view tries to minimize the relevance of tropics, germs,
and crops as a fundamental determinant of differences in economic develop-
ment and income level by arguing that economic policies and institutions are
a result of current knowledge and political forces. Within this perspective,
to change income levels it is necessary to understand each country policies
and institutions. Ultimately, the authors seek to empirically address which
of these three views / theories are more adequate to explain differences in
income levels across countries4.
Easterly & Levine (2003) uses settler mortality as an indicator of endow-
ments to test the geography and the institutions hypotheses and other con-
trol variables such as: latitude, dummies for crops / minerals, landlocked, a
measure for openness (Frankel & Romer 1999), real exchange rate overvalu-
ation and inflation to address the policy view, and six indexes for quality of
institutions draw from Kaufmann et al. (2008) to capture the relevance of in-
stitutions in a per capita income model. The authors also use other control
variables such as ethno linguistic diversity, religion and French legal origin.
The initial step was to estimate a model for a sample of 72 countries by
OLS with heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors for the log of the per
capita GDP on the endowment variables and the results indicate that endow-
ments explain cross-country variation in per capita income. The next step
4The geography/endowment hypothesis is associated to different studies such as Sachs &
Warner (1995), Sachs & Warner (1997), Bloom & Sachs (1998) and O’Neill (2001), arguing for
the presence of direct effects of tropics, germs, and crops on development. The institutions hy-
pothesis relates the effect of tropics, germs, and crops through institutions and can be associated
to works such as Hall & Jones (1999) who uses institutional quality as one component of social
infrastructure which is crucial to explain differences in productivity, allowing for the use of in-
struments such as distance from the equator and European language. Acemoglu et al. (2001)
is another example of the institution view with a germs theory of institution by using settler’s
mortality as an instrument for institutions. The policy view argues in favor of sound macroe-
conomic policies, openness to international trade, and the absence of capital account controls
considered as important measures to foster economic growth and to increase per capita income.
Tropics, germs, and crops may influence production technologies and institutions but to improve
economic development it is necessary to change policies targeting low inflation, increase in trade
and financial integration to the world. One example of this view is Frankel & Romer (1999)
to whom geography matters for economic development through government policy (trade open-
ness).
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was to run an OLS model and check if endowments help to explain cross-
country differences in institutional development and the results indicate that
variables like settler mortality and natural resources (germs and crops) are the
dominant forces to understand institutional development. Up to this point
the Easterly & Levine (2003) have found evidence that endowments have an
impact on economic and institutional development. Following this result, the
authors estimate a 2SLS model for the log of per capita GDP using four instru-
ments (settler mortality, latitude, landlocked and crops/minerals) in the first
stage estimation, and institutions index, French legal origin, religion, ethno
linguistic diversity and oil as exogenous variables in the second stage estima-
tion. The estimated coefficients for the institution indexes are all positive and
statistically significant and the overidentification tests were not rejected indi-
cating that the set of instruments are valid. The final estimated model treats
macroeconomic policy variables (inflation, openness and real exchange rate
overvaluation) as endogenous using 2SLS and the evidence suggests that such
policies do not explain differences in per capita income after taking into ac-
count the impact of institutions on income levels. The estimated coefficients
for the institution index are all positive and statistically significant.
The empirical evidence found by Easterly & Levine (2003) suggests that
endowments (tropics, germs, and crops) have an impact on per capita income
through institutions but not a direct effect, which is a support for the institu-
tion view but not for the geography one. The same is true for what they call
policies variables which has no impact on development when controlling for
institutions, in other words, institutions rule differences in per capita income
levels across countries. Such empirical results are hand to hand with the work
of Acemoglu et al. (2001).
Acemoglu & Robinson (2004) review what is called the geography hypoth-
esis as an alternative to explain difference in economic performance among
countries and the main idea is to focus on the role of physical and geographi-
cal environment. This approach emphasizes differences in geography, climate
and ecology as fundamental in understanding how preferences and the oppor-
tunity set of individual economic agents in different societies. The geography
hypothesis can be divided into three versions. The first one highlights how
climate may be an important factor of work effort, incentives, or productivity.
The second one argues that geography may determine the technology avail-
able to a society, especially in agriculture, while the last one is based on the
idea that infectious disease is costly and more likely to happen in the tropics
than in the temperate zones, which can mitigate economic performance over
time (Sachs 2000).
One can say that there is a clear disagreement among the role played by
geography in explaining differences in per capita income levels. Sachs (2003)
is an example of studies that do not agree with others such as Acemoglu et al.
(2001), Easterly & Levine (2003) and Rodrik et al. (2004) on the proposition
that the role of geography in explaining cross-country differences in per in-
come is secondary and operates mainly through institutions. According to the
author per capita income, economic growth, and other economic and demo-
graphic dimensions are strongly correlated with variables associated to geog-
raphy and ecology, including climate zone, disease ecology, and distance from
the coast. The variable used to corroborate his argument is malaria trans-
mission, which is strongly affected by ecological conditions and has a direct
impact on per capita income once controlling for institutions quality.
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Rodrik et al. (2004) empirically investigates the contribution of institu-
tions, geography and trade in explaining differences in per capita income
across countries and the evidence suggests the predominance of institutions
over geography and trade using different instruments. The authors argue that
integration to the world economy and the quality of institutions should be
treated as endogenous since they affect each other and are affected by geo-
graphical variables and by income levels. Dealing with this means to take
into account endogeneity and reverse causality issues in estimating a cross
country income model.
The main empirical evidence found by Rodrik et al. (2004) is that once in-
stitutions are part of the regression (2SLS), integration has no direct effect on
per capita income, while geographymeasures have at best only weak direct ef-
fects even though they are important to understand the quality of institutions.
Trade does not reveal to be statistically significant once institutions are con-
trolled for and it seems to have an unexpected negative sign. The estimated
coefficients for the measure of property rights and the rule of law are positive
and statistically significant. The authors also found similar evidence to East-
erly & Levine (2003) that geography has a significant impact on the quality
of institutions and this is the channel through which it affects income levels.
In the preferred model specification (settler mortality as instrument for insti-
tutions quality) developed by Rodrik et al. (2004) it was possible to account
for half of the variance in cross country incomes and trade and distance from
the equator are not statistically significant. Comparing the estimated coef-
ficients (table 2 and OLS) for institutions (rule of law), geography (distance
from the equator) and integration (log of trade to GDP) after they have been
standardized in order to be comparable, the results for the log of GDP per
capita reveals that the coefficient for institutions is positive and statistically
significant and greater than the coefficient for geography (positive and signif-
icant), which is greater than the estimated coefficient for integration (positive
but not significant). The 2SLS estimation reported on table 3 reveals on the
preferred specification (column 6) that the coefficient for institutions is pos-
itive (1.98) and statistically significant, while the coefficients for geography
(−0.72) and integration (−0.31) are not significant and the latter has an unex-
pected sign.
The main criticism stated by Sachs (2003) with respect to the institutions
rule argument is that there are specification problems in the model and how
they test the primacy of institutions. The first specification problem is associ-
ated to the use of a static rather than a dynamic model for per capita income
and the author argues that it is more likely that the quality of institutions in a
given time period will affect the growth rate and not the income level but the
three mentioned studies are concerned in explaining differences in per capita
income and not in growth rates across countries. Other than this, Sachs (2003)
argues that differences in income levels should not be explained by only a few
variables excluding geography and the choice made by studies such as Rodrik
et al. (2004) in using distance from the equator is not adequate. Sachs (2003)
uses three instruments to estimate a 2SLS model of the log of GNP per capita
adjusted to PPP: KGPTEMP is a measure of the share of a country population
in temperate ecozones; LOGMORT is an estimate of mortality rates of British
soldiers and other populations in the early 19th century; and ME is a measure
of malaria risk. For all the regressions quality of institutions and malaria risk
are statistically significant.
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Regarding the use of indexes of institutional quality based on surveys of
foreign and domestic investors (Rule of Law, Corruption, Investment Profile
and Bureaucracy) Rodrik et al. (2004) states that such indexes are able to cap-
ture investor’s perceptions but not exactly which are the rules governing these
institutions, which is a limitation and future research on growth disparities
will have to deal with this. It is also necessary to distinguish between stimulat-
ing and sustaining economic growth and better and more reliable institutions
are more important for the latter than to the former meaning that developing
countries can boost initial growth with some minor changes in their institu-
tional environment.
3 Institutions and GDP per capita Level: Empirical Evidence
This section summarizes methodological aspects of using the two stages least
square (2SLS) estimation method for models of cross country income differ-
ences and reports the estimation results on tables 1 and 2.
3.1 Empirical Methodology
This section of the paper has two goals. First, specify the 2SLS estimation pro-
cedures since it is widely used in the cross section models of differences in per
capita income across countries. Second, compare the estimated coefficients
for different sets of countries using institutions, geography, integration and
instrumental variables.
The cross section empirical studies on per capita income differences across
countries are almost always based on the use of 2SLS estimation since this is
the core instrument when dealing with endogeneity problems as it happens
with the inclusion of institutions in this kind of model.
Considering the following model for a dependent variable (y) on a single
regressor (x):
yi = βxi + ui . (1)
Assuming that the regressor (x) is endogenous, the OLS estimation is not valid
since it violates the assumption required for consistency that the error term
(u) is not correlated to the regressors (Cov(x,u) = 0) and the instrumental
variable (IV) approach deals with this by selecting new variables (z) that are
highly correlated to the regressors (Cov(z,x) , 0) but not with the error term
(Cov (z,u) = 0).
The 2SLS estimation is based on a two stage procedure where the first
implements an OLS estimation of the endogenous variable (proxy for institu-
tions) as the dependent variable as a function of exogenous variables and the
new set of instruments (z) and this is called the reduced form equation. The
second stage is the OLS regression of the dependent variable of the original
model (log of per capita GDP) on the exogenous variables and the replace-
ment of endogenous regressors by predictions from the first stage. One ad-
vantage of the 2SLS estimation is that in the presence of independent and
homocedastic errors it is the most efficient estimator but since this is not an
easy assumption, we use the correction for heteroskedasticity in our estimates
(tables 1 and 1).5
5Another possibility is to use the optimal GMM estimator (OGMM) with the heteroskedastic-
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3.2 Empirical Results
First of all, it should be emphasized that the set of instruments used in the
2SLS estimation when dealing with endogeneity of institutions (Law) is Set-
tlerMort, Legoruk, EnglishLang, and EuropeLang, where for integration (Trade)
we use the index developed by Frankel & Romer (1999) to capture perceived
integration. 6
The estimation of the cross-section models of per capita GDP levels for
the complete sample (91 countries) using 2SLS is reported on table 1. The
2SLS estimated models (columns 5, 6, 7 and 8) show that the coefficients for
institutions (Law) are positive and statistically significant in all four models.
It is necessary to interpret this result with some caution since models (5) and
(6) that are over-identified have overidentification tests that reject the null
at 5%, and so the instruments are not valid. Comparing the 2SLS and the
OLS coefficients for Law one can see that the 2SLS estimation provides higher
estimates. Geography (Latitude) has a negative (unexpected) coefficient for
models (6) and (7) but in both cases it is not statistically significant while in
model (8) it has a positive and significant coefficient. Trade (integration) is not
statistically significant in the two 2SLS estimation (7 and 8) regardless if it is
considered as exogenous (7) or treated as endogenous (8) and instrumented
by FrankelRomer index of perceived trade openness.
The next step is to estimate the same models from table 1 but now for a
restricted sample which includes countries in our sample with data for Settler
Mortality, which is the instrumental variable used by Acemoglu et al. (2001).
The only difference is that on table 2, settler mortality was used as an instru-
ment while in table 1 it was not.
The 2SLS estimated models from table 2 (columns 5, 6, 7 and 8) show that
ity correction, which is based on a weighting matrix that it different from the one used by 2SLS
estimation. One of the problems associated to 2SLS estimation is how to avoid the use of weak
instruments since they will result in less precise coefficients due to high standard errors (lower
t-statistics) and the occurrence of finite sample bias (the IV estimator is not centered on the true
populational coefficient). See Cameron & Trivedi (2008) chapter 6 for further details on 2SLM
and OGMM. The paper uses overidentification tests with the estat overid command for Stata 10.0
and the estat firststage command to evaluate the presence of weak instruments (F-stat of first
stage). Table A.4 of the appendix reports additional estimation such as the OGMM for the cross-
section models in order to have a broader range of coefficient estimates and to compare them with
the 2SLS.
6Law is a variable based on two components, the first one (Law) is an assessment of the
strength and impartiality of the legal system while the second (Order) is an assessment of popular
observance of the law. In order to obtain the instrument for Lawwe follow three basic approaches.
The first one uses variables that capture the influence of Western Europe across countries and it
is based on the argument that a higher influence is associated to a more developed institutional
environment. According to this approach, the variables used as instruments are the fraction of
the population of each country speaking English, denominated as EnglishLang, and the fraction
of the population speaking one the major languages ofWestern Europe (English, French, German,
Portuguese, or Spanish), denominated as EuropeLang (Hall & Jones 1999). The second approach
uses variables that distinguish countries regarding the origin of the legal system and are based on
the argument that the British legal system (English Common Law) is associated to a higher degree
of institutional development. In order to do this, the variable LegorUK is a dummy assuming the
value 1 for countries where the origin of the legal system is British and zero otherwise ((La Porta
et al. 1999),(La Porta et al. 2008)). The third one uses variables that captures the conditions faced
by the settlers in the ex-colonies and is based on the argument that where they faced the most
adverse conditions for settlement, the worst institutions were introduced and they persisted over
time. In order to do this the variable used as instrument is the mortality rate faced by the settlers
in the ex-colonies, denominated as SettlerMort (Acemoglu et al. 2001). For a complete list of
variables and a more detailed definition see appendix table A.1.
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the coefficients for institutions (Law) are positive and statistically significant
in all four models. In the same way when we present the results from table
1, it is necessary to interpret this result with some caution since models(5),(6)
and(7) that are over-identified have overidentification tests that reject the null
at 5% and so the set of instruments are not valid. Geography (Latitude) is
not statistically significant in any of the three models using 2SLS and it has
an unexpected negative sign in models 6 and 7. Trade (integration) is not
statistically significant in the two 2SLS estimation (7 and 8) regardless if it is
considered as exogenous(7) or treated as endogenous(8) and instrumented by
the index constructed by Frankel & Romer (1999).7
After the cross-section estimation reported on tables 1 and 2 the paper de-
velops an empirical investigation on the issue of weak instruments based on
a set of tests reported in table 3. 8 Stock & Yogo (2005) developed two tests
for weak instruments and following Cameron & Trivedi (2008) we implement
these tests for the cross-section analysis. Basically the tests have a null hypoth-
esis that the instruments are weak against the alternative that they are strong
and the idea is to look at the Robust F statistics for joint significance of instru-
ments in the first-stage regression and the minimum eigenvalue statstics and
compare these with the critical values from Stock & Yogo (2005) tables. A rule
of thumb for the F statistics is that if it is greater than 10 we can say that it is
possible to reject the null of weak instruments.
Examining table 3 we can see that the Robust F statistics do not reject the
null for models (5), (6) and (7) for the complete and restricted sample when
Law is the instrumented variable so there is evidence of weak instruments,
except for model (8) in both samples when Trade is included as endogenous
variable in the model. Once we look at the minimum eigenvalue statistics
there is evidence of weak instruments for all models except when Trade is
treated as endogenous, model (8) in both samples.
Summarizing the results for the cross-country differences in per capita in-
come levels it is fair to say that there are some mixed evidences regarding
the role of institutions (Law) since all the estimated coefficients are positive
and statistically significant but there is evidence that theinstruments are not
valid and even if they are we do have weak instruments for the most estimated
models.Integration (Trade) and Geography (Latitude) do not seem to play a di-
rect and significant role on explaining differences in per capita income levels
across countries when modeling institutional variables (Law) as endogenous
or even when integration (Trade) is considered endogenous.
4 Institutions and GDP per capita Growth: Empirical Evidence
This section of the paper presents some methodological issues on panel data
estimation for long run growth models and the use of the generalized method
of moments (GMM) reporting on table 4 and 5 the estimated coefficients for
the complete sample and for developing countries.
7Examining the results from table 4A of the appendix for a comparison of different estimation
methods we can see that there is a significant variation on the estimated coefficients when using
the Jacknife IV (JIVE) and the LIML estimators that are asymptotically equivalent to 2SLS butmay
have better finite sample properties than 2SLS. The estimated coefficients for 2SLS and OGMM
are much more similar for both complete and restricted samples.
8See table 3A of the appendix for the correlation analysis of Law and the instruments for the
complete and restricted sample. The correlation coefficients are high and vary from 0.2 to 0.51.
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Table 3: Testing for Weak Instruments
Model Table 1 - Complete Sample Table 2 - Restricted Sample
Specification (5) (6) (7) (8) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Endogenous
Variable
Law Law Law Trade Law Law Law Trade
Robust F 3.1333 2.1425 2.0853 92.8977 4.8976 2.7220 3.3966 82.0486
Min Eigenvalue
Statistics
3.0900 2.1411 2.7077 114.1610 5.3836 2.9803 3.0477 74.6584
2SLS relative bias 13.91 13.91 13.91 16.85 16.85 16.85
2SLS Size of
Nominal 5% Wald
Test
22.30 22.30 22.30 16.38 24.58 24.58 24.58 16.38
Note: 2SLS relative bias is 5% critical value and 2SLS Size of Nominal 5% Wald Test is 10%
critical value.
4.1 Empirical Methodology
This section of the study aims to specify the methodology of panel data anal-
ysis using GMM estimation to be used in the econometric analysis, specifying
the growthmodels to be estimated, the number of countries in the sample and
the explanatory variables.
The study uses a dynamic panel data model specification and the motiva-
tion for the use of this methodology is the possibility to take into account the
following: (i) the time series dimension of the data, (ii) non observable coun-
try specific effects; (iii) inclusion of lagged dependent variable among the ex-
planatory variables, and (iv) the possibility that all explanatory variables are
endogenous.
The standard approach on panel data starts with the assumption that the
growth rate path is consistent with the following procedure:
yi,t − yi,t−1 = (α − 1)yi,t−1 + β
′Xi,t + ηi + εi,t , i = 1, . . . ,N,t = 2, . . . ,T , (2)
where y is the natural log of per capita real GDP, X represents the set of ex-
planatory variables, η is a non-observable and country specific term, εis a
random term and the subscripts i and t refers to country and time, respec-
tively9.
It should be noted that the time specific effect allows to control the in-
ternational conditions that change over time and ultimately affect the growth
performance of countries in the sample, while the non observable country spe-
cific effect (η) incorporates factors that influence the growth of per capita GDP
and are potentially correlated with the explanatory variables.What character-
izes the dynamic relationship is the presence of lagged dependent variable as
one of the explanatory variables, which is evident once we rewrite equation
(2) as:
yi,t = αyi,t−1 + β
′Xi,t + ηi + εi,t . (3)
The elimination of the country specific and the non observable term (η) is
obtained once we apply first difference to equation (3):
yi,t − yi,t−1 = α(yi,t−1 − yi,t−q2) + β
′(Xi,t −Xi,t−1) + (εi,t − εi,t−1) (4)
9The model specification includes a term that varies over time and is constant across coun-
tries, and such term is not reported in the following equations just to simplify the presentation.
This time-specific term is part of all regressions estimated by including the time Dummies vari-
ables for each period (five year average) of the sample.
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The use of instruments is required to deal with the possible endogeneity of
the explanatory variables and the correlation between the new term of error,
εi,t−εi,t−1, and the lagged dependent variable, yi,t−1−yi,t−2. Under the assump-
tions that the error term (ε) is not serially correlated and the explanatory vari-
ables (X) are weakly exogenous, lagged values of the explanatory variables can
be used as instruments, as specified under the following moment conditions:
E
[
yi,t−s ·
(
εi,t − εi,t−1
)]
= 0 for all s ≥ 2; t = 3, . . . T (5)
E
[
Xi, t−S ·
(
εi,t − εi,t−1
)]
= 0 for all s ≥ 2; t = 3, . . . ,T (6)
The GMM estimator based on the moment conditions (5) and (6) is called
Difference GMM and we call this GMM-DIFF throughout the paper. There are
statistical problems associated with the use of GMM-DIFF: statistically, when
the regressors in equation (4) are persistent, lagged levels of X and y are weak
instruments. The use of weak instruments asymptotically implies that the
variance of the coefficient increases and in small samples the coefficients can
be bias. To reduce the potential bias and inaccuracy associated with the use of
DIFF-GMM estimator, Arellano & Bover (1995) and Blundell & Bond (1998)
develop a system of regressions in differences and levels. The instruments for
the regression in differences are the lagged levels of the explanatory variables,
moment conditions (5) and (6). The instruments for the regression in levels
are the lagged differences of explanatory variables. These are appropriate in-
struments under an additional assumption, that is, although there may be
correlation between the levels of explanatory variables and the country spe-
cific effect (η) in equation (3), there is no correlation between those variables
in differences and the country specific effect (η). This can be represented as:
E
[
yi,t+p .ηi
]
= E[yi,t+q .ηi ]
and
E
[
Xi,t+p .ηi
]
= E[Xi,t+q .ηi ], for all p and q. (7)
The moment conditions for the regression in levels, which is the second part
of the system, are:
E
[
(yi,t−s − yi, t−s−1).(ηi + εi,t)
]
= 0, for s = 1. (8)
E
[
(Xi,t−s −Xi, t−s−1).(ηi + εi,t)
]
= 0, for s = 1 (9)
The GMM estimator based on the moment conditions (5), (6), (8) and (9) is
called System GMM or GMM-SYST throughout the paper. The consistency
of the GMM estimator depends on the validity of the moment conditions. To
such extent it will be considered two specification tests based on Arellano
& Bond (1991), and Arellano & Bover (1995) and Blundell & Bond (1998):(i)
Hansen test is a test of overidentifying restrictions and the joint null hypothe-
sis is that the instruments are valid, i.e., uncorrelated with the error term, and
that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equa-
tion; (ii) and the Arellano-Bond test which tests the hypothesis of no second
order serial correlation in the error term.
Recently, studies such as Roodman (2009a) and Roodman (2009b), develop
a detailed analysis on instrument proliferation when using Difference GMM
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and System GMM. The author discusses the symptoms of instrument prolif-
eration showing that as the time dimension increases, the number of instru-
ments can be too large compared to the sample size and the outcome is that
some asymptotic results and specification tests are not valid. Too many instru-
ments can over fit endogenous variables and fail to expunge their endogenous
components, resulting in biased coefficients. Another argument is that the
Hansen and Difference-in-Hansen tests can be weak when using the Differ-
ence GMM and System GMM in the presence of overidentification.
In order to deal with too many instruments, Roodman (2009a) suggest the
use of the collapse suboption for the xtabond2 command in Stata. The author
develops an analysis on the existence of two techniques to limit the number of
instruments generated in difference and system GMM. The first one is based
on the idea of using only certain lags instead of all available lags for instru-
ments and in this case the number of instruments per period is limited in
such a way that it is linear in T. The use of the Collapse suboption is part of the
second approach to reduce the number of instruments and it is the one rec-
ommended by the author. The main idea is to combine instruments through
addition into smaller sets, without dropping any lags as the first technique
does. The Collapse suboption implies the creation of one instrument for each
variable and lag distance, rather than one for each time period, variable, and
lag distance, where the final outcome is to divide the GMM-style moment con-
ditions into groups and sums the conditions in each group to form a smaller
set of conditions. At the end, we have a set of collapsed instruments where
one is made for each lag distance, with zero substituted for anymissing values
and making the number of instruments linear in T.10
The panel data model is estimated for the complete sample (91 countries)
and for developing countries over the period 1980-2004. The data used are
transformed and are based on averages for non-overlapping periods of five
years (1980-1984, 1985-1989, 1990-1994, 1995-1999, 2000-2004), so that there
are five data entries for each country for each variable in the sample. The rea-
son for using five year average data is to minimize the business cyclical effects
and the error term to be less likely to face autocorrelation problems (see Islam
(1995)). There is no data for all countries, time and variables, so the estimated
panel is an unbalanced one. The variables used in the econometric estimation
are reported on table A.1 of the appendix, where the variables were in the
logarithmic form except for the time dummies and the indexes of institution
quality.
4.2 Empirical Results
The analysis of table 4 reveals that the coefficient for institution (Law) is pos-
itive in for all models and statistically significant only when using the GMM-
SYST for the complete sample in a more parsimonious specification (without
Credit, Pop and TermsTrade) and this result stands in three out of four (5, 6
and 8) estimation models for developing countries11. The results also suggest
10A more detailed presentation including matrix notation can be found in Roodman (2009a),
p.148-149. See also Baltagi (2008) for further empirical examples using the collapse command.
11The results for the AR(2), Hansen andHansen Diff tests indicate that we are able to reject the
null hypothesis meaning that there is no second order autocorrelation and the instruments are
valid, with only one exception for the Hansen Diff test in model specification (1) using System-
GMM.
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that Gov (government consumption) has a negative and statistically signifi-
cant coefficient in all estimated models, suggesting a robust role played by
such policy variable, meaning that countries with more fiscal discipline bene-
fit over time in terms of fostering economic growth12.
Someminor evidence of significance was found for Educ only for model(2)
using GMM-SYST, for Credit in models (4) and (8) using GMM-DIFF but only
at 10% and for Pop in model (2) using the GMM-SYST. The estimated coeffi-
cients for the integration to the world economy (Trade), macroeconomic sta-
bility (Inf) and Terms of Trade were not statistically significant in any model
specification13.
After all one can say that the empirical result for the long-run per capita
GDP growth models suggest that there are mixed evidence for the role of
institutions (Law) in fostering economic growth and the GMM-SYST is the one
that is more likely to capture such role and the quality of institutions seems to
bemore relevant for developing countries. Another lesson to be draw from the
estimated growth models is that fiscal discipline (policy variable), measured
by government consumption / GDP, plays a crucial role in stimulating long-
run growth.
Recent work such as Roodman (2009a) and Roodman (2009b) and Bazzi
& Clements (2009) emphasize the need for a deeper investigation on weak in-
struments for cross-section and instrument proliferation for panel data anal-
ysis. Since for one model (1) the overidentification tests from table 4 suggest
the existence of poor instruments and given the use of a significant number
of instruments, especially for the System GMM, we have estimated the same
model using a reduced number of instruments (collapse command in Stata)
and the results are reported on table 5.
Comparing the results with fewer instruments (table 5) with the ones from
table 4 one can see that for the complete sample (columns 1, 2 3 and 4) in-
stitutions (Law) has a positive and significant coefficient in model (4) and
only at 10%, which is different from previous estimation when System-GMM
was more likely to capture such role for institutions in the complete sample
and developing countries were more likely to face significant estimated coef-
ficients. Government spending and population growth have significant coef-
ficients for the System GMM estimation using the complete sample, while for
the Difference GMM model (4), years of schooling (Educ) and credit are sig-
nificant but with unexpected signs. For developing countries (columns 5 to
8) government spending is the only variable with significant coefficient for all
models and population growth for System GMM. There is no significant co-
efficient for institutions (Law) regardless of the estimation method or model
specification which is a contrasting result with the one from previous estima-
tion where in three out of four models for developing countries Law has a
positive and significant coefficient. Such results can be seen as additional em-
pirical evidence that there is no empirical support for the argument that insti-
12Sala-I-Martin & X. (1990) develops a theoretical and empirical investigation on the contri-
bution of government spending to growth considering not only government consumption, as we
have done in our paper, but also government investment (infrastructure) suggesting a possibility
that government investment can foster economic growth.
13Conditional convergence (negative coefficient for Yinitial) is observed for all estimated mod-
els except for model (5) and most coefficients are statistically significant except for models (1)
and (5).
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tutions rule, especially if the research deals more carefully with instruments
proliferation.
At the end, the results from the growth model estimation with and with-
out limiting the number of instruments do not allow us to argue in favor of
institutions causing growth or having a primary role when compared to other
control variables.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper aims to answer two theoretical and empirical questions. First, in-
stitutions have a primary role on explaining huge cross-country differences
on per capita income levels when compared to other control variables such as
integration and geography? Second, does long-run growth performance relies
mainly on quality of institutions?
Considering the results for the cross-country differences in per capita in-
come levels there are some mixed evidence regarding the role of institutions
(Law) since all the estimated coefficients are positive and statistically signifi-
cant but the set of instruments is not valid. Integration (Trade) and Geogra-
phy (Latitude) do not seem to play a direct and significant role on explain-
ing differences in per capita income levels across countries. The results from
the per capita GDP growth models suggest that there are mixed evidence for
the role of institutions (Law) in fostering long-run economic growth and the
GMM-STST is the one that is more likely to capture such role and developing
countries are the ones where such role is more relevant. The estimated growth
models when dealing with instrument proliferation have shown that it is even
harder to corroborate the argument that institutions rule.
The paper provides two main contributions to the literature. First, the
empirical analysis can be considered an advance on methodological grounds
by developing a rigorous investigation on whether or not the instruments
are valid, relevant and if there is instrument proliferation, which are crucial
for parameter estimation and inference since institutions are endogenous to
growth and development. The second contribution is related to the fact that
once we consider the issue of excessive, relevant and valid instruments, the hy-
pothesis that institutions cause differences in per capita income and in long-
run growth is not corroborated by the empirical results, which questions a
relative consensus on the literature.
Even though good institutions are associated to high levels of per capita
GDP and higher long-run growth rates the empirical evidence presented here
do not allow one to state that there is conclusive evidence that institutions
have a primary role on the explanation of cross-country per capita income
differences nor we can say that long-run per capita growth relies mainly on
the quality of institutions (Law).
Regarding the role of institutions one can say that more frequently than
not, they are somehow specific to each economy and society and the ones that
perform well in one setting may not be adequate in a different environment
depending on complementary institutions and norms. One example is the
comparison of institutions for Russia and China as pointed out by (Rodrik
et al. (2004), Rodrik (2008)) where the later does not have a western type of in-
stitution regarded as more adequate to foster economic growth and increase
income levels but it has found specific ways to stimulate and attract an enor-
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mous amount of investments and the establishment of domestic contracts that
ultimately seems to be quite effective in improving growth and income.
There is an extensive list of empirical studies on income levels and growth
models trying to address the issue of endogeneity problems, reverse causality
and their pitfalls, together with an attempt to separate the interpretation of
what is really important in explaining differences in income levels and growth
rates across countries and what roles the set of instruments play in this inter-
pretation. Rodrik et al. (2004) argue that it is crucial to make a distinction be-
tween using an instrument and developing a theory of cause and effect, which
according to the authors is not clear in studies such as Acemoglu et al. (2001)
and Easterly & Levine (2003). Instruments should be viewed simply as hav-
ing some desirable statistical properties and not as having a large part of the
causal story.
There are some crucial aspects such as providing security of property rights,
the enforcement of contracts, increase integration to the international mar-
ket, macroeconomic stability and a process of building better voice and ac-
countability, but the pace and paths to achieve such elements are different
for each country, especially when comparing developing and developed coun-
tries. That is what Rodrik (2008) call as appropriate institutions since each
country has distinct economic and social constraints when they implement
institutions reforms.
Recent empirical studies on growth and income levels such as Bazzi &
Clements (2009) have emphasized the need for caution and further investiga-
tion on the use of weak instruments (cross-section analysis) and instruments
proliferation (panel data analysis) especially for System GMM estimation and
the results comparing different data sets and using distinct econometric tech-
niques have shown that there is clear evidence of weak instruments and exces-
sive number of instruments in most previous empirical work on income levels
and growth models. Our empirical results corroborate these recent empirical
findings. Glaeser et al. (2004) is another example of studies examining the
robustness of using three sets of data as proxies for institutional quality and
they stress different sources of problems with these data and they consider
such indicators to be conceptually unsuitable for the empirical investigation
of the proposition that institutions cause growth. This line of argument sheds
light to the need of improving data collection and their use in growth and
cross-section per capita income models.
Our empirical results have not been able to corroborate the idea that insti-
tutional quality can be considered as cause of differences in per capita income
among countries since our overidentification tests do not allow one to distin-
guish between such institutions been a result of economic prosperity or their
cause. Future empirical research on cross country income levels and growth
models should be focused on the choice of instruments and the construction
of better indexes for institutions that are able to capture some specificities of
each country in terms of different chains / environment through which insti-
tutions might work in terms of stimulating income levels and growth.
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Appendix A
Table A.1: Classification and Variable Description
Variables Description Source
Growthppp Real GDP per capita growth, measured by PPP. Log
difference of GDP per capita over period.
World
Development
Indicators
(2008)
GDP percapita Real GDP per capita level in 2004, mensured by PPP. World
Development
Indicators
(2008)
Yinitial Real GDP per capita level in 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995,
2000, mensured by PPP.
World
Development
Indicators
(2008)
Educ Average number of years of schooling of the
population aged above 15 years in 1980, 1985, 1990,
1995, 2000.
Barro,
Strazicich & M.
(2001)
Inf Inflation as measured by the consumer price index
reflects the annual percentage change in the cost to the
average consumer of acquiring a fixed basket of goods
and services that may be fixed or changed at specified
intervals, such as yearly (annual %).
World
Development
Indicators
(2008)
Gov General government final consumption expenditure
includes all government current expenditures for
purchases of goods and services. It also includes most
expenditures on national defense and security, but
excludes government military expenditures that are
part of government capital formation (% of GDP).
World
Development
Indicators
(2008)
Trade Trade is the sum of exports and imports of goods and
services measured as a share of gross domestic
product (% of GDP).
World
Development
Indicators
(2008)
Credit Domestic credit to private sector refers to financial
resources provided to the private sector, such as
through loans, purchases of nonequity securities, and
trade credits and other accounts receivable, that
establish a claim for repayment (% of GDP).
World
Development
Indicators
(2008)
Pop Annual population growth rate. Population is based
on the de facto definition of population, which counts
all residents regardless of legal status or
citizenship–except for refugees not permanently
settled in the country of asylum, who are generally
considered part of the population of the country of
origin (annual %).
World
Development
Indicators
(2008)
Law The Law sub-component is an assessment of the
strength and impartiality of the legal system; the
Order sub-component is an assessment of popular
observance of the law. Average yearly rating from 0 to
6, where a higher score means lower risk.
International
Country Risk
Guide (2008)
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Table A.1: Classification and Variable Description (continued)
Variables Description Source
Latitude Absolute value of the latitude of the country (i.e., a
measure of distance from the equator), scaled to take
values between 0 and 1, where 0 is the equator
La Porta et al.
(1999)
EnglishLang
and
EuropeLang
"EnglishLang" and "EuropeLang" are the "first"
language variables, corresponding to the fraction of
the population speaking English and the fraction of
the population speaking one of the major languages of
Western Europe (English, French, German, Portuguese,
or Spanish).
Hall & Jones
(1999)
SettlerMor Estimated mortality for European settlers during the
early period of European colonization (before 1850);
settler mortality is calculated from the mortality rates
of European-born soldiers, sailors, and bishops when
stationed in colonies; it measures the effects of local
diseases on people without inherited or acquired
immunities.
Acemoglu et al.
(2001)
Legoruk Dummy variables denote the legal origin of the
Company Law or Commercial Code of each country.
Equals 1 if the origin is English Common Law
La Porta et al.
(1999)
FrankelRomer Frankel-Romer predicted trade share. The predicted
trade share is computed from a gravity model based
only on population and geography.
Hall & Jones
(1999)
TermsTrade Terms of trade shocks. Log difference of the terms of
trade over period.
World
Development
Indicators
(2008)
Africa Dummy for African Countries
yr8084, yr8589,
yr9094,
yr9599, yr0004
Time dummies
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Table A.2: Sample of Countries
Algeria Greece Omã
Argentina Guatemala Pakistan
Australia Haiti Panama
Austria Honduras Papua New guinea
Bahrein Hong Kong Paraguay
Bangladesh Iceland Peru
Belgium India Philippines
Bolivia Indonesia Portugal
Botswana Iran Saudi Arabia
Brazil Ireland Senegal
Burkina Faso Israel Singapore
Cameroon Italy South Africa
Canada Jamaica Spain
Chile Japan Sri Lanka
China Jordan Sudan
Colombia Kenya Sweden
Congo Korea Switzerland
Costa Rica Kuwait Syrian Arab Rep.
Cote d’ivoire Madagascar Thailand
Dem. Rep. of Congo Malawi Togo
Denmark Malaysia Trinidad and Tobago
Dominican Republic Mali Tunisia
Ecuador Malta Turkey
Egypt Mexico Uganda
El Salvador Morocco United Kingdom
Ethiopia Netherlands United States
Finland New Zealand Uruguay
France Nicaragua Venezuela
Gabon Niger Zambia
Germany Nigeria
Ghana Norway
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